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1 Introduction
The (Nash) implementation problem consists in investigating the existence
of a mechanism whose (Nash) equilibrium outcomes coincide with the op-
timal outcomes set by a given social choice correspondence (SCC), that is,
SCC-optimal.1 If such a mechanism exists, it is said to (Nash) implement
the SCC. Seminal papers on two-agent implementation are those of Moore
and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991) who independently refined
Maskin’s characterization result (Maskin, 1999)2 by providing necessary and
sufficient conditions for an SCC to be implementable. Notable parts of these
conditions are the monotonicity condition and the punishment condition, as
they limit our ability to implement SCCs more than others.
The two-agent implementation problem with partially-honest agents has
recently been analyzed by Dutta and Sen (2009) on the assumption that
agents’ preferences are linear orders.3 Their remarkable contribution is that
the scope of implementation is enlarged as the stringent condition of mono-
tonicity is not longer required, no even in the more problematic case of two
agents. This paper extends their analysis to the domain of weak orders in
view of its potential applications to bargaining and negotiating. It almost
fully identifies the class of implementable SSCs, not only in the case that
both agents are partially-honest but also in the more subtle case that exactly
one agent is partially-honest.
Following Maskin (1999), the paper assumes that the message conveyed
by each agent to the mechanism designer involves the announcement of
a preference profile (i.e., agents’ preferences over outcomes). A message
is truthful if it involves the announcement of the true preference profile.
Moreover, it retains Dutta and Sen (2009)’s idea that a partially-honest
agent is an agent who strictly prefers to announce a truthful message rather
than an untruthful one when the former (given a message announced by
1For excellent introductions to the theory of implementation see for instance Jackson
(2001) and Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002).
2The first version appeared in 1977.
3The role of partial honesty has also been recently analyzed by Matsushima (2008) in
a different set-up when there are more than two agents.
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the other agent) produces an outcome which is at least as good as the one
that would be achieved if the agent lied (keeping constant the other agent’s
message). To give an example, suppose that agent h is partially-honest
and she believes that the other agent i will send the message mi. Suppose
that mh is the truthful message of agent h while m
′
h is the untruthful one.
Suppose that the message profile (mh,mi) results in the outcome y, whereas
the message profile (m′h,mi) leads to a different outcome x. Let the agent h
be indifferent between x and y on the basis of her true preferences. Unlike an
agent that is concerned solely with her outcomes, the agent h strictly prefers
(mh,mi) to (m
′
h,mi). A different way of describing a partially-honest agent
is that the agent at issue has preferences over message profiles in which she
displays concerns for two dimensions in lexicographic order: (1) her outcome
and (2) her truth-telling behavior.
The identification of implementable SCCs becomes more complicated
and subtle when weak orders are considered. For instance, even the una-
nimity property which is satisfied by all SCCs used in social choice literature
is violated on the domain of weak orders.4 To explain this aspect, let us
continue with our previous example by assuming that agents i and h rank
outcomes x and y most highly and the SCC is Nash implementable with
partially-honest agents. For simplicity’s sake, assume that only agent h is
partially-honest. Then, we have a mechanism and a corresponding message
profile leading to x. Suppose that this message profile is (m′h,mi). When
the preference domain consists only of linear orders, we deduce that x = y
(by the antisymmetry of the agents’ preferences). Since the agent h strictly
prefers (mh,mi) to (m
′
h,mi) and there cannot be any further profitable de-
viation, we can conclude that x is SCC-optimal. Notably, the antisymmetry
of the agents’ preferences is precisely what enables Dutta and Sen to employ
some of the standard two-agent implementing conditions to fully identify the
class of implementable SCCs. When indifference is permitted, however, out-
comes x and y can be different outcomes. Since the agent h strictly prefers
(mh,mi) to (m
′
h,mi) and the former message profile leads to y, we can no
4An SCC that satisfies unanimity if it selects alternatives that are ranked most highly
by all agents.
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longer conclude that x is SCC-optimal.
In the framework developed by Moore and Repullo (1990), we therefore
devise new implementing conditions with a small “gap” between necessary
and sufficient conditions. Our conditions are much weaker than the standard
two-agent implementing conditions. In line with Dutta and Sen (2009),
the condition of monotonicity is not longer required, whereas the condition
guaranteeing the existence of the punishment outcome is required even in
the case that both agents are known to be partially-honest. It may be
worthwhile to emphasize that the “gap” between our conditions gets closed
when the domain of preferences consists only of linear orders and, more
importantly, they reduce to the necessary and sufficient conditions employed
by Dutta and Sen (2009) on this domain.
The notable part of our necessity properties is the punishment condition,
as all other parts incorporate weak versions of no-veto power and unanim-
ity.5 While the first part of this condition guarantees the existence of the
punishment outcome the second part involves weak versions of the standard
punishment condition. They state that if - under some requirements - the
punishment outcome is an equilibrium outcome, it should be SCC-optimal.
On the domain of linear orders, this second part is always satisfied (vacu-
ously).
Our necessary conditions, however, are too weak to ensure the imple-
mentability of SCCs. Then, when both agents are partially-honest, we show
that a slight strengthening of our conditions is sufficient for a full imple-
mentation. When exactly one agent is partially-honest and the domain of
preferences is sufficiently rich, a full implementation is again ensured by a
slight strengthening of the corresponding necessary conditions. Examples
of preference domains which satisfy our richness condition would be the set
of all profiles of weak orders, linear orders and single peaked preferences.
It may be worth considering here that we also devise new implementing
mechanisms in between those devised by Moore and Repullo (1990) and
Busetto and Codognato (2009). Our mechanisms turn up to be an improve-
5An SCC that satisfies no-veto power must select an alternative if it is ranked most
highly by all but at most one agent.
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ment upon Dutta and Sen (2009)’s mechanisms in the sense that ours are
endowed with a lower dimensional strategic space.
Given that all our conditions will be stated in choice-theoretical lan-
guage, we also examine conditions and specify domain restrictions which
allow us to give a quick answer to the question of implementability.
To begin with, we suppose the existence of a “bad outcome”. On this
supposition, we show that, on the one hand, an SCC satisfying the condition
of restricted veto power is implementable when exactly one agent is partially-
honest, whereas, on the other, when both agents are partially-honest, an
SCC is implementable if it satisfies unanimity and a condition considerably
weaker than restricted veto power. In this set-up, for instance, the class of
non-monotonic and strong individually rational bargaining solutions such as
the Nash bargaining solution defined on the class of utility possibility sets
is implementable with partially-honest agents by setting the disagreement
point as a bad outcome.6
Second, we consider the restriction on the domain of preferences intro-
duced by Busetto and Codognato (2009). On this domain, we show that
an SCC is implementable if it satisfies restricted veto power and non-empty
lower intersection when exactly one agent is partially-honest, whereas una-
nimity and non-empty lower intersection suffice to ensure the implementabil-
ity of SCCs when both agents are partially-honest. Consider a two-agent
exchange economy with at least two divisible goods in which agents have
continuous and strict monotonic preferences and in which indifference curves
never touch the axes. Suppose that the SCC selects only interior allocations
of the feasible set. In this set-up many interesting non-monotonic SCCs sat-
isfy restricted veto power - and so unanimity - and non-empty lower inter-
section. A special instance of our results is that the ω−efficient-egalitarian
correspondence is implementable with partially-honest agents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal envi-
ronment. Section 3 reports our analysis when exactly one agent is partially-
honest, whereas Section 4 reports the analysis when both agents are partially-
honest. Section 5 reports the implications of our results. Section 6 concludes.
6See Vartiainen (2007).
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2 The implementation problem
The set of outcomes is denoted by X and the set of agents is N = {1, 2}.
The cardinality of X is #X ≥ 2. Let R (X) be the set of all weak orders
on X.7 Let Ri ⊆ R (X) be the (non-empty) set of all admissible weak
orders of agent i ∈ N .8 Let R2 ≡ R1 × R2 be the set all admissible weak
order profiles (or states). An generic element of R2 is denoted by R, where
its ith component is Ri ∈ Ri, i ∈ N . The symmetric and asymmetric
factors of any Ri ∈ Ri are, in turn, denoted Pi and Ii, respectively. Let
P2 ⊆ R2 be the set of all admissible profiles of linear orders.9 Let L (Ri, x)
denote agent i’s lower contour set at (Ri, x) ∈ Ri ×X, that is, L (Ri, x) ≡
{y ∈ X| (x, y) ∈ Ri}. Let SL (Ri, x) denote agent i’s strict lower contour
set at (Ri, x) ∈ Ri ×X, that is, SL (Ri, x) ≡ {y ∈ X| (x, y) ∈ Pi}. For any
Ri ∈ Ri, let maxRi X be the set of maximal alternatives according to Ri,
that is, maxRi X := {x ∈ X| (x, y) ∈ Ri for all y ∈ X}.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) on R2 is a correspondence F :
R2 ⇒ X with ∅ 6= F (R) ⊆ X for all R ∈ R2. An SCC F is monotonic if,
for all R,R′ ∈ R2 with x ∈ F (R), x ∈ F (R′) whenever L (Ri, x) ⊆ L (R′i, x)
for all i ∈ N .
A mechanism is a pair (M, g), where M ≡M1×M2, with each Mi being
a (non-empty) set, and g : M → X. It consists of a message space M ,
where Mi is the message space for agent i ∈ N , and an outcome function g.
Let mi ∈Mi denote a generic message (or strategy) for agent i. A message
profile is denoted m ≡ (m1,m2) ∈ M . Given a mechanism (M, g) and an
R ∈ R2, the set of truthful messages for agent i ∈ N , denoted Ti (R,F ), is
a correspondence Ti : {R} × Si ⇒ Mi such that ∅ 6= Ti (R,F ) ⊆ Mi, where
Si represents the other components of Mi.
7A weak order is a complete and transitive binary relation. A relation R on X is
complete if, for all x, x′ ∈ X, (x, x′) ∈ R or (x′, x) ∈ R; transitive if, for all x, x′, x′′ ∈ X,
if (x, x′) ∈ R and (x′, x′′) ∈ R , then (x, x′′) ∈ R.
8The weak set inclusion is denoted by ⊆.
9A linear order is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. A binary
relation R on X is antisymmetric if, for all x, x ∈ X, x = x′ whenever (x, x′) ∈ R and
(x′, x) ∈ R.
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For any i ∈ N and R ∈ R2, let <Ri be agent i’s weak order over M
under the state R. The asymmetric factor of <Ri is denoted Ri , while the
symmetric part is denoted ∼Ri . Given a mechanism (M, g) and an R ∈ R2,
(M, g,R) represents a (noncooperative) game. An agent i ∈ N is a partially-
honest agent if, for all games (M, g,R), for all (mi,mj) , (m
′
i,mj) ∈M , with
i 6= j:
(i) for any mi ∈ Ti (R,F ) and m′i /∈ Ti (R,F ), if (g (mi,mj) , g (m′i,mj)) ∈
Ri, then ((mi,mj) , (m
′
i,mj)) ∈Ri ;
(ii) otherwise, (g (mi,mj) , g (m
′
i,mj)) ∈ Ri if and only if ((mi,mj) , (m′i,mj)) ∈<Ri .
Given an agent i ∈ N , if she is not partially-honest then, for each game
(M, g,R), for all m,m′ ∈M :(
m,m′
) ∈<Ri if and only if (g (m) , g (m′)) ∈ Ri.
A mechanism (M, g) induces a class of (non-cooperative) games
{(
M, g,<R
) |R ∈ R2}.
Given a game
(
M, g,<R
)
, we say that m = (mi,mj) ∈ M is a (pure strat-
egy) Nash equilibrium at R if and only if, for all i ∈ N , (m, (m′i,mj)) ∈<Ri
for all m′i ∈ Mi, with i 6= j ∈ N . Let N
(
M, g,<R
)
denote the set of Nash
equilibria message profiles of
(
M, g,<R
)
, whereas Ng
(
M, g,<R
)
represents
the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
The mechanism (M, g) is said to partially-honest implement F on R2
(in Nash equilibria) if and only if
Ng
(
M, g,<R
)
= F (R) for all R ∈ R2.
If such mechanism exists, then F is partially-honest (Nash) implementable.
Following Dutta and Sen (2009) we use the following informational as-
sumptions throughout the paper.
Assumption A1 (for short, A1 ). There exists exactly one partially-honest
agent in N . This is known to the mechanism designer. However, the identity
of this agent is unknown to the mechanism designer.
Assumption A2 (for short, A2 ). Both agents are partially-honest. This is
known to the mechanism designer.
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The next condition basically requires that the class of admissible pref-
erences is sufficiently rich. Examples of preferences domains satisfying the
condition would be the set of all profiles of weak orders, linear orders, and
single peaked preferences on X. Hence, our models are applicable to eco-
nomic environments.
Condition D (for short, D). For any i ∈ N , R ∈ R2 and x ∈ X, (R′i, Rj) ∈
R2 wheneverR′i ∈ Ri (X) is such that L (R′i, x) = L (Ri, x), with ∂L (R′i, x) =
{x}.10
This condition has been used by Lombardi and Yoshihara (2010b) to pro-
vide almost full characterizations of partially-honest implementable SCCs in
the case of “more than two agents” with strategy space reduction.11
3 Exactly one partially-honest agent
In this section we make the informational assumption that there is exactly
one partially-honest agent; the mechanism designer is aware of this fact
but ignores the identity of the partially-honest agent (A1 ). We begin by
proving that if an SCC F is partially-honest implementable, then it must
satisfy Condition µ2∗ below. Although such a condition is quite complex, it
is in fact very weak.
Definition 1. An SCC F on R2 satisfies Condition µ2∗ if there exists
Y ⊆ X, and, for each i ∈ N , R ∈ R2 and x ∈ F (R), there is a set Ci (R, x)
such that x ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y . Moreover, for each R∗ ∈ R2, we
have:
(i) (a) For each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X × R2 × X × R2, with x ∈ F (R) and
x′ ∈ F (R′), there is e ≡ e (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ C1 (R, x) ∩ C2 (R′, x′), with
e (x,R, x,R) = x.
(b) If R = R′ = R∗, (x,R) 6= (x′, R′), (e, x) ∈ I∗1 and (e, x′) ∈ I∗2 , then
e ∈ F (R∗).
10∂L (R′i, x) = {x} means that, for all x′ ∈ L (R′i, x), with x 6= x′, (x, x′) ∈ P ′i .
11See, for instance, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2010a) and the literature cited therein.
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(c) If x 6= x′, C1 (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗1, e), C2 (R′, x′) ⊆ L (R∗2, e), and: (1) if R =
R∗ 6= R′, e = x and (e, xˆ) /∈ I∗1 for all xˆ ∈ C1 (R, x) \ {e}, then e ∈ F (R∗);
(2) if R 6= R∗ = R′, e = x′ and (e, xˆ) /∈ I∗2 for all xˆ ∈ C2 (R′, x′) \ {e}, then
e ∈ F (R∗).
(ii) If y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
for some i, j ∈ N , with
i 6= j, and for all xˆ ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i , for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈
I∗j , then y ∈ F (R∗).
(iii) If z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , z) for all i ∈ N , and for each i ∈ N , for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {z},
(xˆ, z) /∈ I∗i , then z ∈ F (R∗).
We can state our first result as follows.
Proposition 1. Let A1 hold. A partially-honest implementable SCC F on
R2 satisfies Condition µ2∗.
Proof. Let A1 hold and let h ∈ N be the partially-honest agent. Let
(M, g) be a mechanism which partially-honest implements F on R2. Let
Y ≡ g (M). Take any R ∈ R2 and any x ∈ F (R). Then, there is an equi-
librium strategy m∗ (x,R) ≡
(
m∗i (x,R) ,m
∗
j (x,R)
)
∈ N (M, g,<R) such
that g (m∗ (x,R)) = x. Moreover, {x} ⊆ g
(
Mi,m
∗
j (x,R)
)
⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y
for any i ∈ N . This is true even for h. In fact, if m∗h (x,R) /∈ Th (R,F ),
m∗ (x,R) ∈ N (M, g,<R) implies that (g (m∗ (x,R)) , g (m′h,m∗` (x,R))) ∈
Ph for any m
′
h ∈ Th (R,F ), with h 6= ` ∈ N . For i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, let
Ci (R, x) ≡ g
(
Mi,m
∗
j (x,R)
)
for all i ∈ N .
Take any R∗ ∈ R2 and (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X × R2 × X × R2, with x ∈
F (R) and x′ ∈ F (R′). Let e ≡ e (x,R, x′, R′) = g (m∗1 (x′, R′) ,m∗2 (x,R))
where m∗1 (x′, R′) is the equilibrium message of agent 1 supporting x′ as an
equilibrium strategy when the state is R′. Then, e ∈ C1 (R, x) ∩C2 (R′, x′),
and so Condition µ∗2(i.a) is met. It is also clear that F meets Condition
µ∗2(i.b) as every agent is truthful and e is optimal at state R∗. Moreover, it
is also obvious that F satisfies Condition µ∗2(i.c) as, for instance, in the case
µ∗2(i.c.1) the only deviator can be agent 1 whenever she is partially-honest,
but her deviation to the truthful message results in the same outcome e as
(e, xˆ) /∈ I∗1 for all xˆ ∈ C1 (R, x) \ {e}.
Take any R∗ ∈ R2. Let y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
,
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for i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i for all xˆ ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {y} and (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗j
for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {xˆ}. We show y ∈ F (R∗) = Ng
(
M, g,<R∗
)
. Assume, to
the contrary, that y /∈ Ng
(
M, g,<R∗
)
. Let g (m) = y with mj = m
∗
j (x,R).
It follows that m /∈ N (M, g,<R∗). By our suppositions it follows that the
only deviator is the partially-honest agent h ∈ N . Suppose h = i. Then,
mh /∈ Th (R∗, F ) and there is an m′h ∈ Th (R∗, F ) such that g (m′h,mj) = y
and ((m′h,mj) ,m) ∈R
∗
i . Since there cannot be any further deviation, it
follows that y ∈ Ng
(
M, g,<R∗
)
= F (R∗) which yields a contradiction.
Similar argument applies if h = j. We conclude that F meets Condition
µ∗2(ii).
Take any R∗ ∈ R2 such that, for each i ∈ N , z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , z) and
(xˆ, z) /∈ I∗i for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {z}. As z ∈ Y it follows that g (m) = z for
some m ∈ M . We show that z ∈ F (R∗). Assume, to the contrary, that
z /∈ F (R∗) = Ng
(
M, g,<R∗
)
, so that m /∈ N (M, g,<R∗). As for each
i ∈ N we have (xˆ, z) /∈ I∗i for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {z} it follows that the only deviator
is the partially-honest agent h. Without loss of generality, let h = 1. Then,
m1 /∈ T1 (R∗, F ) and there is an m′1 ∈ T1 (R∗, F ) such that g (m′1,m2) = z.
Then, ((m′1,m2) ,m) ∈R
∗
1 . Since there cannot be any further deviation,
it follows that z ∈ Ng
(
M, g,<R∗
)
= F (R∗), a contradiction. We conclude
that F meets Condition µ∗2(iii). 
We now turn to sufficient conditions under which an SCC F can be
partially-honest implemented. The conditions are stated below.
Definition 2. An SCC F on R2 satisfies Condition µ2∗∗ if there exists
Y ⊆ X, and, for each i ∈ N , R ∈ R2 and x ∈ F (R), there is a set Ci (R, x)
such that x ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y . Moreover, for each R∗ ∈ R2, we
have:
(i) (a) For each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X × R2 × X × R2, with x ∈ F (R) and
x′ ∈ F (R′), there is e ≡ e (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ C1 (R, x) ∩ C2 (R′, x′), with
e (x,R, x,R) = x; and
(b) If R = R′ = R∗, (x,R) 6= (x′, R′), (e, x) ∈ I∗1 and (e, x′) ∈ I∗2 , then
e ∈ F (R∗).
(c) If R∗ ∈ {R,R′}, R 6= R′, x 6= x′, C1 (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗1, e), C2 (R′, x′) ⊆
L (R∗2, e), then e ∈ F (R∗).
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(ii) If y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
, for i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j,
and [for all xˆ ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i , for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗j ]
or [L (R`, y) = L (R
∗
` , y) for all ` ∈ N ], then y ∈ F (R∗).
(iii) If z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , z) for all i ∈ N , and for each i ∈ N , (xˆ, z) /∈ I∗i for
all xˆ ∈ Y \ {z}, then z ∈ F (R∗).
Although this condition is rather long and complex, it is in fact weak.
Condition µ2 (Moore and Repullo, 1990) is stronger than Condition µ2∗∗.
In particular, the class of SCCs that satisfy our condition is larger than the
one satisfying Condition µ2. One reason is that the class of SCCs satisfying
Condition µ2∗∗ does contain non-monotonic SCCs.
It is clear that Condition µ2∗∗ implies Condition µ2∗. The exact differ-
ence between these two conditions is that Condition µ2∗∗(i.c) and Condi-
tion µ2∗∗(ii) are stronger than respectively Condition µ2∗(i.c) and Condition
µ2∗(ii).
We show that Condition µ2∗∗ is sufficient to ensure the partially-honest
implementability of SCCs if R2 satisfies the richness Condition D and the
informational assumption A1 holds. To obtain this result we devise a new
mechanism that is in between the mechanism devised by Moore and Repullo
(1990) and the one devised by Busetto and Codognato (2009). Each agent
message space has the following specification: for i ∈ N ,
Mi :=
{(
Ri, xi, yi, ki
) ∈ R2 ×X × Y × Z+ : xi ∈ F (Ri)} , (1)
where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. Our message space specification
is smaller than that specified by Dutta and Sen (2009) as it does not include
the set consisting of the two elements ”flag” and ”no flag”, that is, {F,NF}.
Our next result also shows that the strategic choice in the set {F,NF} can
be omitted.
Proposition 2. Let D and A1 hold. An SCC F on R2 is partially-honest
implementable if it satisfies Condition µ2∗∗.
Proof. Let D and A1 hold. Let h ∈ N be the partially-honest agent.
Suppose that F on R2 meets Condition µ2∗∗. Let (M, g) be a mechanism.
For each i ∈ N , let the message space of agent i be that defined in (??).
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Define the outcome function g : M → X as follows: For any m ∈M ,
Rule 1: If
(
R1, x1
)
=
(
R2, x2
)
and k1 = k2 = 0, then g (m) = x1.
Rule 2: If k1 > k2 = 0, then
g (m) =
{
y1 if y1 ∈ C1
(
R2, x2
)
e ≡ e (x2, R2, x1, R1) otherwise.
Rule 3: If k2 > k1 = 0, then
g (m) =
{
y2 if y2 ∈ C2
(
R1, x1
)
e ≡ e (x2, R2, x1, R1) otherwise.
Rule 4: If
(
R1, x1
) 6= (R2, x2) and k1 = k2 = 0, then
g (m) =
{
x1 if x1 = x2
e ≡ e (x2, R2, x1, R1) otherwise.
Rule 5: If k1 ≥ k2 > 0, then, g (m) = y1.
Rule 6: Otherwise, g (m) = y2.
We show that (M, g) partially-honest implements F . For, let R ∈ R2.
Since F satisfies Condition µ2∗∗, F
(R2) ⊆ Y . Thus, for any R ∈ R2
and any x ∈ F (R), x ∈ Y .
To show that F (R) ⊆ Ng
(
M, g,<R
)
, let x ∈ F (R) and suppose that,
for all ` ∈ N , m` = (R, x, x, 0) ∈ M`. Rule 1 implies that g (m) = x. By
the definition of g we have that any deviation of agent i ∈ N will get him
to an outcome in Ci (R, x), so that g (Mi,mj) ⊆ Ci (R, x). Since Ci (R, x) ⊆
L (Ri, x), such deviations are not profitable. As every agent is truthful as
well, it follows that x ∈ Ng
(
M, g,<R
)
.
Conversely, to show that Ng
(
M, g,<R
) ⊆ F (R), let m ∈ N (M, g,<R).
Consider the following cases.
Case 1: m corresponds to Rule 1.
Suppose that m falls into Rule 1. Then, g (m) = x1. By the definition
of g it follows that mh ∈ Th (R,F ). For, assume, to the contrary, that mh /∈
Th (R,F ). Let h = 1. Then, by changing mh with m
′
h =
(
R, xh, x1, kh
) ∈
Th (R,F ), with x
h ∈ F (R) and kh > 0, agent h induces Rule 2 and obtains
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x1 = g (m′h,m2) ∈ Ch
(
R2, x2
)
. Therefore, ((m′h,m−h) ,m) ∈Rh which
contradicts that m ∈ N (M, g,<R). The same reasoning applies if h = 2
given that he can induce Rule 3. It follows that x1 ∈ F (R), as we sought.
Case 2: m corresponds to Rule 2.
Then, g (m1,M2) = Y and C1
(
R2, x2
) ⊆ g (M1,m2). Moreover, since
m ∈ N (M, g,<R) it follows that C1 (R2, x2) ⊆ L (R1, g (m)) and Y ⊆
L (R2, g (m)). By the definition of g we have that mh ∈ Th (R,F ). As D
holds, there exists Rˆ ∈ R2 such that L (R`, g (m)) = L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
, with
∂L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
= {g (m)}, for all ` ∈ N . Condition µ2∗∗(ii) implies that
g (m) ∈ F
(
Rˆ
)
. Since F satisfies Condition µ2∗∗ there exists a profile(
C`
(
Rˆ, g (m)
))
`∈N
such that C`
(
Rˆ, g (m)
)
⊆ L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
∩ Y for any
` ∈ N . As, by construction, L (R`, g (m)) = L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
for any ` ∈ N ,
Condition µ2∗∗(ii) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R).
Case 3: m corresponds to Rule 3.
The proof can be obtained by simply readapting the proof of Case 2, so
we omit it here.
Case 4: m corresponds to Rule 4.
Suppose that g (m) = x1 = x2. By the definition of g we have that
mh ∈ Th (R,F ), and so x1 ∈ F (R).
Otherwise, let x1 6= x2, and so g (m) = e ∈ C1
(
R2, x2
) ∩ C2 (R1, x1).
By the definition of g we have that Ci
(
Rj , xj
) ⊆ g (Mi,mj) for i, j ∈ N ,
with i 6= j, and mh ∈ Th (R,F ). Since m ∈ N
(
M, g,<R
)
it follows that
C1
(
R2, x2
) ⊆ L (R1, e) and C2 (R1, x1) ⊆ L (R2, e). We proceed according
to whether R1 = R2 or R1 6= R2.
Sub-case 1: R1 = R2
Then, e ∈ C1
(
R, x2
) ∩ C2 (R, x1). Since x1, x2 ∈ F (R) it follows from
Condition µ2∗∗ that C1
(
R, x2
) ⊆ L (R1, x2) and C2 (R, x1) ⊆ L (R2, x1).
As we have also established that C1
(
R, x2
) ⊆ L (R1, e) and C2 (R, x1) ⊆
L (R2, e), it follows that
(
e, x2
) ∈ I1 and (e, x1) ∈ I2. Condition µ2∗∗(i.b)
implies that e ∈ F (R).
Sub-case 2: R1 6= R2
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Recall that C1
(
R2, x2
) ⊆ L (R1, e), C2 (R1, x1) ⊆ L (R2, e) and x1 6= x2.
As mh ∈ Th (R,F ) it follows that either R1 = R or R2 = R. Condition
µ2∗∗(i.c) implies that e ∈ F (R).
Case 5: m corresponds to Rule 5.
Then, g (m1,M2) = Y and g (M1,m2) = Y . Since m ∈ N
(
M, g,<R
)
it
follows that Y ⊆ L (R1, g (m)) and Y ⊆ L (R2, g (m)). By the definition of
g we have that mh ∈ Th (R,F ). As D holds, there exists Rˆ ∈ R2 such that
L (R`, g (m)) = L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
, with ∂L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
= {g (m)}, for all ` ∈ N .
Condition µ2∗∗(iii) implies that g (m) ∈ F
(
Rˆ
)
. Since F satisfies Condition
µ2∗∗ there exists a profile
(
C`
(
Rˆ, g (m)
))
`∈N
such that C`
(
Rˆ, g (m)
)
⊆
L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
∩ Y for any ` ∈ N . As, by construction, L (R`, g (m)) =
L
(
Rˆ`, g (m)
)
for any ` ∈ N , Condition µ2∗∗(ii) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R).
Case 6: m corresponds to Rule 6.
The proof can be obtained by simply readapting the proof of Case 5, so
we omit it here. 
4 Both agents partially-honest
In this section we assume that both agents are partially-honest and that
this fact is known to the mechanism designer (A2 ). We begin by stating
our necessary condition for Nash implementation below.
Definition 3. An SCC F on R2 satisfies Condition µ2◦ if there exists
Y ⊆ X, and, for each i ∈ N , R ∈ R2 and x ∈ F (R), there is a set Ci (R, x)
such that x ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y . Moreover, for each R∗ ∈ R2, we
have:
(i) (a) For each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X × R2 × X × R2, with x ∈ F (R) and
x′ ∈ F (R′), there is e ≡ e (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ C1 (R, x) ∩ C2 (R′, x′), with
e (x,R, x,R) = x;
(b) If R = R′ = R∗, (x,R) 6= (x′, R′), (e, x) ∈ I∗1 and (e, x′) ∈ I∗2 , then
e ∈ F (R∗).
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(ii) If R = R∗, y = x, y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
for some
i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, then y ∈ F (R∗);
(iii) If z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , z) for all i ∈ N , (xˆ, z) /∈ I∗i for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {z}, then
z ∈ F (R∗).
Our next result shows that Condition µ2◦ is met by any partially-honest
implementable SCC when A2 holds.
Proposition 3. Let A2 hold. A partially-honest implementable SCC F on
R2 satisfies Condition µ2◦.
Proof. Since it is clear that F meets Condition µ2◦(ii) if it is partially-
honest implementable and the proof of the remaining parts of Condition µ2◦
can easily be obtained by readapting the arguments provided in Proposition
1, we omit the formal proof here. 
We turn to sufficient conditions for partially-honest implementation. The
sufficient condition can be stated as follows:
Definition 4. An SCC F on R2 satisfies Condition µ2◦◦ if there exists
Y ⊆ X, and, for each i ∈ N , R ∈ R2 and x ∈ F (R), there is a set Ci (R, x)
such that x ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y . Moreover, for each R∗ ∈ R2, we
have:
(i) (a) For each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X × R2 × X × R2, with x ∈ F (R) and
x′ ∈ F (R′), there is e ≡ e (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ C1 (R, x) ∩ C2 (R′, x′), with
e (x,R, x,R) = x; and
(b) If R = R′ = R∗, (x,R) 6= (x′, R′), (e, x) ∈ I∗1 and (e, x′) ∈ I∗2 , then
e ∈ F (R∗).
(ii) If R = R∗, y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
for some
i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, then y ∈ F (R∗);
(iii) If z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , z) for all i ∈ N , then z ∈ F (R∗).
Condition µ2◦◦ is much weaker than the classical Condition µ2 (Moore
and Repullo, 1990). It is worth mentioning that the class of SCC satisfying
Condition µ2◦◦ is larger than that satisfying Condition µ2 as the former
includes non-monotonic SCCs. The differences between Condition µ2◦◦ and
Condition µ2◦ are that µ2◦◦(ii) and µ2◦◦(iii) are stronger than respectively
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Condition µ2◦(ii) and Condition µ2◦(iii). Since Condition µ2◦◦ is slightly
stronger than Condition µ2◦, our next result is almost a complete character-
ization of Nash implementable SCCs when both agents are partially-honest.
It is worth mentioning that the devised mechanism differs from that em-
ployed in Proposition 2 in the definition of the outcome function g.
Proposition 4. Let A2 hold. An SCC F on R2 is partially-honest imple-
mentable if it satisfies Condition µ2◦◦.
Proof. Let A2 hold. The mechanism is slightly different form that used
in Proposition 2 in the sense that if a message profile falls into Rule 2 the
outcome function is:
g (m) =

x1 if x1 = x2
y1 if y1 ∈ C1
(
R2, x2
)
, x1 6= x2
e ≡ e (x2, R2, x1, R1) otherwise.
The outcome function is defined similarly if a message profile falls into Rule
3. We show that (M, g) partially-honest implements F whenever F satisfies
Condition µ2◦◦. For, let R ∈ R2.
Since F satisfies Condition µ2◦◦, F
(R2) ⊆ Y . Thus, for any R ∈ R2
and any x ∈ F (R), x ∈ Y .
The proof that F (R) ⊆ Ng
(
M, g,<R
)
is similar to that of Proposition
2, so we omit it here. Conversely, to show that Ng
(
M, g,<R
) ⊆ F (R), let
m ∈ N (M, g,<R). Consider the following cases.
Case 1: m corresponds to Rule 1.
By a similar argument provided in Proposition 2 it follows x1 ∈ F (R).
Case 2: m corresponds to Rule 2.
Then, g (m1,M2) = Y and C1
(
R2, x2
) ⊆ g (M1,m2). Moreover, since
m ∈ N (M, g,<R) it follows that C1 (R2, x2) ⊆ L (R1, g (m)) and Y ⊆
L (R2, g (m)). By the definition of g we have that mi ∈ Ti (R,F ) for all i ∈
N . If x1 = x2, then g (m) = x1 ∈ F (R). Otherwise, let x1 6= x2. Nothing
has to be proved if g (m) ∈ {x1, x2}. Therefore, let g (m) /∈ {x1, x2}.
Suppose that g (m) = e ∈ C1
(
R, x2
) ∩ C2 (R, x1). Since (e, x2) ∈ I1 and(
e, x1
) ∈ I2, Condition µ2◦(i.b) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R). Finally, let
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g (m) ∈ C1
(
R, x2
)
and g (m) /∈ {x2, x1, e}. Condition µ2◦(ii) implies that
g (m) ∈ F (R).
Case 3: m corresponds to Rule 3.
The proof can be obtained by simply readapting the proof of Case 2, so
we omit it here.
Case 4: m corresponds to Rule 4.
Then, Ci
(
Rj , xj
) ⊆ g (Mi,mj) for i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j. Moreover,
we have that m` ∈ T` (R,F ) for all ` ∈ N . Since m ∈ N
(
M, g,<R
)
it
follows that C1
(
R2, x2
) ⊆ L (R1, g (m)) and C2 (R1, x1) ⊆ L (R2, g (m)).
Since m` ∈ T` (R,F ) for all ` ∈ N , it must be that x1 6= x2, otherwise a
contradiction. Then, g (m) = e ∈ C1
(
R2, x2
) ∩ C2 (R1, x1). Since x1, x2 ∈
F (R) it follows from Condition µ2◦◦ that
(
e, x2
) ∈ I1 and (e, x1) ∈ I2.
Condition µ2◦◦(i.b) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R).
Case 5: m corresponds to Rule 5.
Then, g (m1,M2) = Y and g (M1,m2) = Y . Since m ∈ N
(
M, g,<R
)
it follows that Y ⊆ L (R1, g (m)) and Y ⊆ L (R2, g (m)). Moreover, all
agents are reporting truthfully, i.e., m` ∈ T` (R,F ) for all ` ∈ N . Condition
µ2◦◦(iii) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R).
Case 6: m corresponds to Rule 6.
The proof can be obtained by simply readapting the proof of Case 5, so
we omit it here. 
5 Implications
In this section we briefly discuss the implications of our results and the
relationship between our conditions and those provided by Dutta and Sen
(2009).
Under the informational assumption A1 (resp., A2 ) and the assumption
that the domain of F is the set of all admissible profiles of linear orders P2,
Dutta and Sen (2009) prove that Condition β1 (resp., Condition β2) is not
only necessary but also sufficient for Nash implementability of SCCs. These
conditions are the following.
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Definition 5 (Dutta and Sen, 2009, p. 12). An SCC F on P2 satisfies
Condition β1 if there exists Y ⊆ X, and, for each i ∈ N , R ∈ P2 and
x ∈ F (R), there is a set Ci (R, x) such that x ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y .
Moreover, for each R∗ ∈ R2, we have:
(i) For each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X×P2×X×P2, with x ∈ F (R) and x′ ∈ F (R′),
there is e ≡ e (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ C1 (R, x) ∩ C2 (R′, x′), with e (x,R, x,R) = x.
(ii) If y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
for some i, j ∈ N , with
i 6= j, then y ∈ F (R∗).
(iii) If z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , z) for all i ∈ N , then z ∈ F (R∗).
Definition 6 (Dutta and Sen, 2009, p. 9). An SCC F on P2 satisfies
Condition β2 if there exists Y ⊆ X, and, for each i ∈ N , R ∈ P2 and
x ∈ F (R), there is a set Ci (R, x) such that x ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y .
Moreover, for each R∗ ∈ R2, we have:
(i) For each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X×P2×X×P2, with x ∈ F (R) and x′ ∈ F (R′),
there is e ≡ e (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ C1 (R, x) ∩ C2 (R′, x′), with e (x,R, x,R) = x.
(ii) If z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , z) for all i ∈ N , then z ∈ F (R∗).
In the next two propositions we show that when the domain of prefer-
ences consists only of linear orders the “gap” between our necessary con-
ditions and sufficient conditions gets closed, and more importantly, these
conditions reduce to Dutta and Sen’s conditions.
Proposition 5. Let F be an SCC defined on P2. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(a) Condition µ2∗∗;
(b) Condition µ2∗;
(c) Condition β1.
Proof. Let F be an SCC defined on P2. It is clear that Condition µ2∗∗
implies Condition µ2∗ which, in turn, implies Condition β1. Therefore, we
show that Condition β1 implies Condition µ2∗∗. It is also clear that β1(i)
and β1(iii) imply µ2∗∗(i.a) and µ2∗∗(iii), respectively. Conditions µ2∗∗(i.b)
and µ2∗∗(i.c) are always vacuously satisfied when F is defined on P2, and so
β1 implies them trivially. Finally, we show that β1 implies condition µ2∗∗(ii).
Let R,R∗ ∈ P2, x ∈ F (R) and y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
,
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for i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, and [for all xˆ ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i ,
for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗j ] or [L (R`, y) = L (R∗` , y) for all ` ∈ N ].
We show that y ∈ F (R∗). Since R∗ ∈ P2, it is always true that, for all
xˆ ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {y}, (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i , and (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗j for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {y}. Condition
β1(ii) implies that y ∈ F (R∗). Therefore, suppose also that it holds that
L (R`, y) = L (R
∗
` , y) for all ` ∈ N . Then, x ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, y) =
L (R∗i , y). It follows from the antisymmetry of Ri that x = y. Again,
Condition β1(ii) implies that y ∈ F (R∗). 
Proposition 6. Let F be an SCC defined on P2. Let F be an SCC defined
on P2. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) Condition µ2◦◦;
(b) Condition µ2◦;
(c) Condition β2.
Proof. Let F be an SCC defined on P2. As it is clear that Condition µ2◦◦
implies Condition µ2◦ which, in turn, implies Condition β2, we have only to
show that Condition β2 implies Condition µ2◦◦. It is also clear that β2(i) and
β2(ii) imply µ2◦◦(i.a) and µ2◦◦(iii), respectively. Furthermore, Condition
µ2◦◦(i.b) is always vacuously satisfied when F is defined on P2, and so β2
implies it trivially. Finally, we show that Condition µ2◦◦(ii) is implied by
β2. Let R,R∗ ∈ P2, with R = R∗, x ∈ F (R), y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and
Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
for some i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j. Since y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x)
and R = R∗ it follow from antisymmetry of Ri that x = y. It trivially
follows that y ∈ F (R∗). 
Condition µ2∗∗ (resp., Condition µ2◦◦) imposes non-trivial restrictions
on F . For example, as Condition µ2∗∗ (resp., Condition µ2◦◦) implies Con-
dition β2 which, in turn, is violated by the Pareto SCC (Dutta and Sen,
2009, p. 14), it follows that this SCC is not Nash implementable in the pres-
ence of partially-honest agents. Despite it, our results are very permissive.
In the following we justify this assertion by providing sufficient conditions
which allow us to give a quick answer to question of implementability.
One avenue is to introduce a bad outcome b ∈ X and make the following
assumption.
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Assumption A3 (for short, A3 ; Moore and Repullo, 1990, p. 1093). There
exists a bad outcome b ∈ X such that for any R ∈ R2 and i ∈ N , (x, b) ∈ Pi
for all x ∈ F (R2) ≡ {y ∈ X|y ∈ F (R′) for some R′ ∈ R2}.
There are economic environments in which it is easy to find a bad out-
come. Consider an exchange economy in which agents have strict monotonic
preferences and the SCC assigns only positive consumption bundles. Under
free disposability, one can define the null consumption bundle as the bad
outcome.
If there is a bad outcome we can set e (x,R, x′, R′) = b for each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈
X × R2 × X × R2 to satisfy Condition µ2∗∗(i) and Condition µ2◦◦(i) vac-
uously. Then, Condition µ2∗∗(ii) and Condition µ2∗∗(iii) (resp., Condition
µ2◦◦(ii) and Condition µ2◦◦(iii)) are sufficient for Nash implementability in
the presence of partially-honest agents.
Even though these conditions can easily be checked by using the algo-
rithm provided by Sjo¨stro¨m (1991), the following conditions, when combined
with A3, are enough to ensure Condition µ2∗∗ (resp., Condition µ2◦◦) and
are easier to check.
An SCC F on R2 satisfies restricted veto power if, for all i ∈ N , R ∈ R2,
x ∈ X and x′ ∈ F (R2) ≡ {y ∈ X|y ∈ F (R) for some R ∈ R2}, x ∈ F (R)
whenever X ⊆ L (Rj , x) for all j ∈ N\ {i} and (x, x′) ∈ Ri. An SCC F on
R2 satisfies weak restricted veto power if, for all i ∈ N , R ∈ R2, x ∈ X
and x′ ∈ F (R), x ∈ F (R) whenever X ⊆ L (Rj , x) for all j ∈ N\ {i}
and (x, x′) ∈ Ri. An SCC F on R2 satisfies unanimity if, for all R ∈ R2,
x ∈ F (R) whenever x ∈ maxR` X for all ` ∈ N .
Unanimity is standard. Restricted veto power is used by Moore and
Repullo (1990, p. 1093) for analyzing the two-agent case under A3 while
weak restricted veto power is new and is considerably weaker than restricted
veto power.
We can now state the following results.
Corollary 1. Let A1 and A3 hold. An SCC F on R2 is partially-honest
implementable if it satisfies restricted veto power.
Proof. Let A1 and A3 hold. Suppose that F on R2 satisfies restricted
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veto power. It suffices to show that A3 and restricted veto power imply
Condition µ2∗∗. Let Y = X; and for any R ∈ R2 and x ∈ F (R), let
Ci (R, x) = L (Ri, x) for each i ∈ N . Since A3 holds, for each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈
X × R2 × X × R2, with x ∈ F (R) and x′ ∈ F (R′), let e (x,R, x′, R′) = b
if (x,R) 6= (x′, R′), otherwise e (x,R, x′, R′) = x. Then, Condition µ2∗∗(i)
is satisfied. To show Condition µ2∗∗(ii), let R,R∗ ∈ R2, x ∈ F (R), y ∈
Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
for some i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, and
[(y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i for all xˆ ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {y} and (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗j for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {y}] or
[L (R`, y) = L (R
∗
` , y) for all ` ∈ N ]. Then , it is easy to see that agent i
cannot veto y as the latter is maximal for j in Y under R∗ and (y, x) ∈ R∗i .
We conclude that restricted veto power implies Condition µ2∗∗(ii). Finally,
to show Condition µ2∗∗(iii) let R∗ ∈ R2, z ∈ Y ⊆ L (R∗i , y) for all i ∈ N ,
and (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i for all xˆ ∈ Y \ {z}. Then, neither agent 1 or agent 2 can veto
z as it is not strictly worse for both of them under the profile R∗ than any
other outcome in F
(R2). 
Corollary 2. Let A2 and A3 hold. An SCC F on R2 is partially-honest
implementable if it satisfies weak restricted veto power and unanimity.
Proof. Let A2 and A3 hold. Suppose that F onR2 satisfies weak restricted
veto power and unanimity. It suffices to show that A3, weak restricted veto
power and unanimity imply Condition µ2◦◦. Let Y = X; and for any R ∈ R2
and x ∈ F (R), let Ci (R, x) = L (Ri, x) for each i ∈ N . Since A3 holds, for
each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X ×R2 ×X ×R2, with x ∈ F (R) and x′ ∈ F (R′), let
e (x,R, x′, R′) = b if (x,R) 6= (x′, R′), otherwise e (x,R, x′, R′) = x. Then,
Condition µ2◦◦(i) is satisfied. To show Condition µ2◦◦(ii), let R,R∗ ∈ R2,
R = R∗, x ∈ F (R), y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, y) and Y ⊆ L (Rj , y) for some
i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j. Nothing has to be proved if y = x. Then, let y 6= x.
It follows readily from weak restricted veto power that y ∈ F (R). Finally,
as unanimity implies Condition µ2◦◦(iii), we conclude that Condition µ2◦◦
is satisfied. 
For instance, suppose that two agents bargain over the division of one
unit of a perfectly divisible good and if they do not reach an agreement they
both receive nothing. In this framework, non-monotonic strong individually
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rational bargaining solutions12 defined on the class of utility possibility sets
such as the Nash bargaining solution are special cases of Corollary 1 and
Corollary 2 by setting the disagreement point d = (0, 0) as a bad outcome.13
Another interesting weak domain restriction is the following.
Assumption Q (for short, AQ ; Busetto and Codognato, 2009). R2 is such
that, for each R∗ ∈ R2, we have:
(i) maxR∗i SL (Ri, x)∩maxR∗j SL (Ri, x) = ∅, for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, R ∈ R2,
and x ∈ X;
(ii) maxR∗1 SL (R1, x) ∩maxR∗2 SL (R′2, x′) = ∅, for each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X ×
R2 ×X ×R2, with (x,R) 6= (x′, R′).
This domain restriction is very mild and much weaker than Assumption
E imposed by Moore and Repullo (1990, p. 1095) and Assumptions 5.1-5.2
imposed by Dutta and Sen (1991, p. 125) whenever X is a subset of a finite-
dimensional Euclidean space.14 For example, this restriction is satisfied
in environments with continuous and locally non-satiated preferences or in
environments in which the set of outcomes is a space of lotteries over a
finite set of outcomes and agents preferences over lotteries are represented
by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Given AQ we can define a
condition that, when combined with others, is enough to ensure Condition
µ2∗∗ (resp., Condition µ2◦◦).
Definition 7. An SCC F on R2 satisfies the non-empty lower intersection
if for any (x,R, x′, R′) ∈ X ×R2×X ×R2, with x ∈ F (R) and x′ ∈ F (R′),
we have that SL (R1, x) ∩ SL (R′2, x′) 6= ∅.
This property appears in Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen
(1991) and holds in many environments. For example, it holds in an ex-
change economy for which indifference curves never touch the axes and for
which the SCC recommends only interior allocations.
12A bargaining solution is strong individually rational if it provides agents with agree-
ments which give them utilities higher than those they derive from the disagreement point
d.
13For Nash bargaining solution defined on the class of utility possibility sets see Varti-
ainen (2007).
14The formal arguments are provided in Busetto and Codognato (2009).
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We can now state our final results.
Corollary 3. Let A1 and AQ hold. An SCC F on R2 is partially-honest
implementable if it satisfies restricted veto power and non-empty lower in-
tersection.
Proof. Let A1 and AQ hold. Suppose that F on R2 satisfies restricted veto
power and non-empty lower intersection. We show that F is partially-honest
implementable. It suffices to show that Condition µ2∗∗ is implied by the
non-empty lower intersection property and restricted veto power when com-
bined with our domain restriction. For each i ∈ N , (x,R) ∈ X×R2, and x ∈
F (R), let Ci (R, x) = SL (Ri, x)∪{x} and Y =
⋃
i∈N
⋃
R∈R2
⋃
x∈F (R)Ci (R, x).
It is easy to verify that Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (Ri, x) ∩ Y . For each (x,R, x′, R′) ∈
X × R2 × X × R2, with x ∈ F (R) and x′ ∈ F (R′), let e (x,R, x′, R′) ∈
SL (Ri, x)∩SL
(
R′j , x
′
)
if (x,R) 6= (x′, R′), otherwise e (x,R, x′, R′) = x. It
is easy to see that µ2∗∗(i) is satisfied as F meets the non-empty lower inter-
section property. Then, it remains to show that µ2∗∗(ii)-µ2∗∗(iii) are met as
well. It is clear that restricted veto power implies µ2∗∗(iii). Finally, to show
that F satisfies µ2∗∗(ii) let y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
,
for i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, and [for all xˆ ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗i , for all
xˆ ∈ Y \ {y} : (y, xˆ) /∈ I∗j ] or [L (R`, y) = L (R∗` , y) for all ` ∈ N ]. Suppose
that y ∈ Ci (R, x) \ {x}. Then, y ∈ maxR∗i SL (Ri, x) ∩ maxR∗j SL (Ri, x)
which contradicts assumption AQ(i). Then, let y = x. Restricted veto
power implies x ∈ F (R∗), as sought. 
Corollary 4. Let A2 and AQ hold. An SCC F on R2 is partially-honest
implementable if it satisfies unanimity and non-empty lower intersection.
Proof. Let A2 and AQ hold. Suppose that F on R2 satisfies non-
empty lower intersection and unanimity. We show that F is partially-
honest implementable. It suffices to show that Condition µ2◦◦ is implied
by the non-empty lower intersection property and unanimity when com-
bined with our domain restriction. Define Ci (R, x), Y and e (x,R, x
′, R′)
in the same way done in Corollary 3. It is easy to see that µ2◦◦(i) is satis-
fied as F meets the non-empty lower intersection property. Then, we have
only to show that µ2◦◦(ii)-µ2◦◦(iii) are met as well. To show that F sat-
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isfies µ2◦◦(ii) let R = R∗, y ∈ Ci (R, x) ⊆ L (R∗i , y) and Y ⊆ L
(
R∗j , y
)
,
for i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j. If y = x, then nothing else has to be proved.
Then, y ∈ maxR∗i SL (Ri, x) ∩maxR∗j SL (Ri, x) which contradicts assump-
tion AQ(i). Finally, as unanimity implies µ2◦◦(iii), we conclude that Con-
dition µ2◦◦ is satisfied. 
For instance, consider a two-agent exchange economy with ` ≥ 2 divisi-
ble goods in which agents have continuous and strict monotonic preferences
and in which indifference curves never touch the axes (for instance, Cobb-
Douglas preferences). Suppose that the SCC F selects only interior alloca-
tions of the feasible set. In this setting, restricted veto power - and so una-
nimity - and non-empty lower intersection are met by F . An example of non-
monotonic F would be the ω−efficient-egalitarian correspondences which
under our assumptions on preferences always exists (Pazner and Schmeidler,
1978).15 Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 imply that the ω−efficient-egalitarian
correspondences is partially-honest implementable.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined the problem of fully implementing SCCs in a two-
agent society when agents are partially-honest. We formalized the prob-
lem by requiring that the domain of preferences consists of all weak orders.
We presented almost necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation,
both when exactly one agent is partially-honest and when both agents are
partially-honest. We then proceeded to relate our conditions to the condi-
tions earlier devised by Dutta and Sen (2009). While our conditions and
Dutta and Sen’s conditions do not imply each other on the domain of weak
orders we found that our conditions are equivalent to their conditions on the
domain of linear orders. Moreover, our conditions are much weaker than the
classic conditions devised by Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen
(1991). In line with earlier results of Dutta and Sen (2009) and Matsushima
(2008), the results presented in this paper confirm that the consideration of
15ω ∈ R`+ is the vector of resources available for distribution, a.k.a. the social endow-
ment.
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partially-honest agents in implementation theory drastically improves the
scope and quality of implementation, though limits still remain. In partic-
ular, the classic condition of monotonicity is no longer required while what
still limits our ability to implement is the punishment condition. Finally, we
identified sufficient conditions and weak domain restrictions which allowed
us to give a quick answer to the question of implementability in a wide range
of applications.
We have not been able to provide necessary and sufficient conditions,
given that indifference wides the “gap” between preferences over outcomes
and preferences over message profiles for partially-honest agents. We conjec-
ture that a full characterization is impossible on the domain of weak orders
if conditions on SCCs are to be formulated in standard terms. However, we
expect that a full characterization of partially-honest implementable SCCs
can be obtained by devising a new suitable definition of implementation.
This is left for further research.
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